Congratulations to my friends and Colleagues Jon Ruckdeschel & Christian Hartley in thier great victory today over Ford. The Maryland Court of Appeals (which is the Maryland Supreme Court) handed down a terrific decision in the Dixon case. A full copy appears below.The intermediate court had reversed the trial verdict and announced a standard for causation proof that would have been outside the majority rule . In reaffirming the Balbos case, the Marland High Court sent a clear message that the scientific concepts discussed decades ago remain valid today.
Unfortunately the plainitff did not win her constitutional challenge to Maryland’s cap on wrongful death damages (not surprisingly). As such, the verdict from trial of $15,000,000 will be capped down to just over 6 million with Ford paying the whole verdict and post judgment interest over the past three years. The Court also reversed the trial court’s grant of JNOV relief with respect to Ford’s cross claim against Georgia Pacific, which had cut the judgment in half. The Court noted that there was nothing remarkable about the jury finding Ford failed to prove the cross claim.
Dixon v. Ford Motor Company
No. 82, September Term 2012, Opinion by Wilner. J. (Retired, Specially Assigned)
IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION WHERE WIFE/MOTHER DIED OF
MESOTHELIOMA ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS-LADEN
DUST BROUGHT HOME BY HUSBAND FROM WORKING ON FORD BRAKE
PRODUCTS AND/OR BY ASBESTOS-LADEN DUST FROM JOINT COMPOUND
USED BY WIFE AND HUSBAND IN HOME IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS:
(1) TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING EXPERT TESTIMONY,
BASED IN PART ON EVIDENCE OF MULTIPLE AND CUMULATIVE
EXPOSURES BY WIFE, OVER 13-YEAR PERIOD, TO ASBESTOS FIBERS FROM
THE FORD BRAKE PRODUCTS, THAT ANY OF THOSE EXPOSURES
CONSTITUTED A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN CAUSING THE
(2) TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERTURNING JURY VERDICT THAT
JOINT COMPOUND USED IN HOME IMPROVEMENT PROJECT WAS NOT A
SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN CAUSING THE MESOTHELIOMA;
(3) CAP ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
INVOLVING TWO OR MORE CLAIMANTS OF 150% OF CAP ON INDIVIDUAL
AWARD OF NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL
PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL, OR ART. 19 OF MD.
DECL. OF RIGHTS;
(4) TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
September Term, 2012
BERNARD DIXON, etc., et al.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned)
Opinion by Wilner, J.
Bell, C.J. and Battaglia, J., dissent.
Filed: July 25, 2013
*Bell, C.J., participated in the hearing of the case, in
the conference in regard to its decision and in the
adoption of the opinion, but he had retired from the
Court prior to the filing of the opinion.
Joan Dixon contracted mesothelioma, from which she eventually died. That the
mesothelioma was caused by her exposure to asbestos is not in dispute. The principal
issue here is, whose asbestos? As germane to what is now before 1 us, there were two
possible culprits – asbestos-laden dust emanating from brakes manufactured by Ford
Motor Company that Ms. Dixon’s husband, Bernard, who handled those products
occupationally, brought home on his clothes, and asbestos possibly contained in a
compound manufactured by Georgia-Pacific Corp. that the Dixons used in building their
home, in some home improvement projects, and in building an adjacent structure.2
The Dixons filed suit against Ford and Georgia-Pacific in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, claiming negligence on their part in failing to warn Ms. Dixon of the
danger lurking in their products. Upon his wife’s death in 2009, Mr. Dixon continued the
1 Particularly in light of a case argued the same day as this one, also involving a
product liability claim by a household member who contracted mesothelioma, Georgia-
Pacific v. Farrar, Md. , A.3d (2013) (S.T. 2012, No. 102), it is important
to note that no issue was raised in this appeal as to whether, prior to 1972, Ford was or
should have been aware of the danger to household members from asbestos fibers brought
into the home on the clothes of another household member. The existence of such direct
or imputed knowledge seems to have been assumed which, given that Ms. Dixon’s
exposure to asbestos dust emanating from Ford products extended well beyond 1972, may
have been appropriate. In any event, because that issue was not raised in this appeal, we
have not addressed it.
2 The Dixons sued several other manufacturers of asbestos-laden products as well,
but, except with respect to a claim against Honeywell International, Inc., the claims
against those defendants are not before us in this appeal.
action as personal representative of her Estate and, along with the couple’s four daughters,
pursued a wrongful death action as well.
After a 12-day trial, the jury concluded that the only substantial contributing factor
in causing Ms. Dixon’s mesothelioma was the dust from the Ford brake products. On that
finding, it returned substantial verdicts in favor of Mr. Dixon and his daughters against
Ford and denied a cross-claim by Ford against Georgia-Pacific. The court subsequently
modified those verdicts in two respects. Applying one aspect of the statutory cap on
awards of non-economic damages (Maryland Code, § 11-108(b)(3)(ii) of the Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Article), the court reduced the amount of the verdicts, and, acting 3 under Md. Rule 2-
535, the court expressed its disagreement with the jury’s conclusion that the Georgia-
Pacific compound was not also a substantial contributing factor and entered judgment for
Ford on its cross-claim against Georgia-Pacific. All other post-trial motions, including
Ford’s motion to enter judgment on its cross-claim against Honeywell International, Inc.,
Both the plaintiffs and Ford filed appeals to the Court of Special Appeals. Several
issues were raised, but only one was addressed – the opinion evidence by the plaintiffs’
3 All of the jury’s awards were for non-economic damages. They totaled $15
million, as follows: (1) to Mr. Dixon, as personal representative of his wife’s estate, $5
million; (2) to Mr. Dixon on his wrongful death claim, $4 million, and (3) to each of the
four daughters on their wrongful deal claims, $1.5 million. As adjusted, the wrongful
death awards were reduced to $426,000 for Mr. Dixon and $159,750 for each of the
– 2 –
principal expert, Dr. Laura Welch, that every exposure to asbestos, including the shortfiber
chrysotile asbestos contained in the Ford brake products, increased the likelihood of
contracting mesothelioma and thus constituted a substantial contributing cause of that
disease. Based on what
the intermediate appellate court believed was a “settled scientific
theory of causation” known by “philosophers of science” as “probabilistic causation,” the
court held that Dr. Welch’s opinion was not helpful to the jury and that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing it into evidence. The court reversed the judgments
entered in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for a new trial and, as a result, did
not consider the cross-claim against Georgia-Pacific or any of the other issues raised by
the parties. We granted the plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari and a conditional crosspetition
by Ford to consider the validity of the Court of Special Appeals decision and the
issues raised in but not decided by that Court.4
There is some overlap in the four questions raised by the plaintiffs 4 and the four
raised by Ford. Eliminating the overlap, the issues, restated by us, are:
(1) Was the Court of Special Appeals correct in concluding that the trial
court erred in admitting Dr. Welch’s opinion testimony, and if so was the trial court’s
(2) If the Court of Special Appeals conclusion was correct, should that court
have directed that a judgment be entered for Ford rather than ordering a new trial;
(3) Did the trial court err (i) in using its revisory power under Rule 2-535 in
entering judgment for Ford against Georgia-Pacific, and (ii) if not, in not using that power
to enter judgment on Ford’s cross-claim against Honeywell – another alleged source of
(4) Does Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, § 11-108(b)(3)(ii), in capping an
award for non-economic damages to multiple claimants in a wrongful death action at
150% of the maximum amount of non-economic damages that may be awarded to an
individual claimant in such an action, violate Federal and State equal protection principles
– 3 –
FACTUAL BACKGROUND – SOURCES OF EXPOSURE
The Dixons were married in 1959 and lived thereafter as a couple in Garrett
County. From 1958 until 1976, Mr. Dixon worked as a poultry inspector for the U. S.
Department of Agriculture, mostly at a plant in Oakland. Upon his retirement from that
position, he purchased and operated an ice cream stand near Deep Creek Lake. Over a 13-
year period, from the early 1960s until 1976, he worked at least two evenings a week, ten
months a year, at a garage owned by a friend, Skip Bernard. In that job, he performed
brake maintenance, repair, and replacement work – on average two brake jobs per week.
About 95% of the brake work Mr. Dixon did involved Ford brakes, which meant that, over
the 13-year period, he performed about 1,000 Ford brake jobs. All Ford brakes and
braking systems during that period contained chrysotile asbestos.
In performing his brake maintenance and repairs, Mr. Dixon used compressed air
and a wire brush to clean the drums and remove debris, and sand paper to remove glaze on
the brake linings. If new brakes were required, he would file the edges of the new brake
shoes before installing them. All of this generated asbestos-laden dust that clung to his
skin, hair, and clothes. When he returned home, in that condition, he threw his clothes in
the basement for his wife to wash. Mr. Dixon testified that she would shake out the
and Articles 5, 19, 23, and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; and
(5) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Ford’s motion for new
trial on the grounds that (i) the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent, against the weight of the
evidence, and shocking, and (ii) plaintiffs’ counsel’s closing arguments were improper
– 4 –
clothes and launder them. There was other testimony that, as early as 1971, one or more of
the daughters also did or helped with the laundry. Evidence was presented that, for nearly
40 years, Ford warned its dealers and employees of the dangers of working with asbestos
in Ford brakes but issued no warnings to anyone else.
With respect to the construction and home improvement work, Mr. Dixon said that
he used drywall in the building of his house in the early 1960s, but he used a powder
mixed with water to fill in the joints and did not know the brand or manufacturer of the
powder. There was no evidence as to whether it was an asbestos-laden Georgia-Pacific
product. In the 1970s, the Dixons built an addition to the house and a separate building on
their property enclosing four apartments and space for a meat processing business. Mr.
Dixon testified that he recalled using a premixed Georgia-Pacific joint compound for both
the drywall seams and a textured ceiling. His wife did the sanding and the cleanup.
Evidence was presented by Georgia-Pacific that from 1963 to 1974, its Ready-Mix joint
compound contained 3% to 8% asbestos, that it introduced an asbestos-free compound in
1974, but that it continued to sell the asbestos compound until 1977. There was no direct
evidence at trial whether the product used by the Dixons contained asbestos.5
In supplemental answers to interrogatories, the Dixons 5 indicated that the
Georgia-Pacific compound may have contained asbestos, but at trial, Mr. Dixon stated
that he did not know whether the compound he and Ms. Dixon used contained asbestos.
Some of the home improvement work they did was in or after 1974, when the nonasbestos
compound was on the market.
– 5 –
DR. WELCH’S TESTIMONY – RESTATED QUESTIONS (1) AND (2)
Prior to trial, Ford filed a motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs’ proposed
causation testimony and to conduct a Frye/Reed (Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978)) hearing regarding testimony
expected from the plaintiffs’ experts. The motion was based on the assertion that there
was no reliable epidemiological evidence that exposure to automotive friction products,
such as brakes, causes mesothelioma and that, indeed, the evidence was that such exposure
does not cause mesothelioma. The motion also asserted that brake dust is not asbestos
because the heat generated during the braking process transforms the asbestos in the brake
lining to non-fibrous forsterite.
After the filing of Ford’s motion, Dr. Welch’s deposition was taken, with respect to
both this and other cases in which she was expected to testify. The essence of her
deposition testimony, which presaged her testimony at trial, was her opinion that, if
someone has mesothelioma, it is asbestos-related and that each and every exposure that
makes up the sum total is a substantial contributing factor to the disease. That, plus the
fact that she no longer did clinical work and had not actually examined Ms. Dixon,
produced a supplemental memorandum from Ford claiming that Dr. Welch was not
qualified as an expert to give an opinion regarding causation of mesothelioma in the wives
– 6 –
of brake mechanics. Ultimately, the court, concluding that it was 6 bound by appellate
decisions on the subject (though indicating some disagreement with those decisions),
denied the motion, qualified Dr. Welch as an expert, and permitted her to testify.
The examination of Dr. Welch at trial was more precis
e than the somewhat
rambling deposition examination. Importantly, for purposes of this appeal, Ford does not
challenge the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to qualify her as an expert. See Ford’s
principal brief at 11, n.6. Given Dr. Welch’s curriculum vitae in the record, that is a
reasonable concession. The present challenge is to the admissibility of her opinion that
each exposure to asbestos, including asbestos-laden dust derived from asbestos contained
in brake linings, may be a contributing cause to mesothelioma, which Ford maintains is not
accepted by the scientific community.
Dr. Welch first addressed the question of whether exposure to asbestos-laden dust
brought into the home constitutes a high or low level of exposure. She stated that studies
looking at household contamination from occupational exposure showed that the
household exposure constituted a high level of exposure. She explained that the asbestos
fibers from a day’s worth of dust on clothes, that gets shaken off, remain on the floor and
in the air for a considerable period of time, so that one day’s worth can produce on-going
exposure for days or even months. The fibers do not dissolve or evaporate. Each day that
6 Although Dr. Welch had not physically examined Ms. Dixon, she said that she
did review Ms. Dixon’s medical records and took the information therein into account in
forming her opinions.
– 7 –
a worker brings home dust-laden clothes adds to that on-going contamination.
She then turned her attention to the subject of dose-response and compared
mesothelioma to asbestosis and lung cancer. Mesothelioma, she said, is a cancer in the
lining of the lung, which has a much smaller mass than the lung itself. Asbestosis is a
scarring of the tissue in the lung. It therefore takes much greater exposure to asbestos to
produce the level of scarring that results in asbestosis than it does to produce
mesothelioma, which is not as dependent on repeated exposure; once a cancer forms, it is
there and does not get worse from further exposure. Lung cancer, she added, has multiple
causes, such as smoking, whereas mesothelioma is caused predominantly by asbestos. Her
conclusion was that even a low exposure to asbestos can cause mesothelioma.
Citing a number of national and international studies, including those from the
World Health Organization, the Environmental Protection Agency, OSHA, and the
National Cancer Institute, Dr. Welch stated that all forms of asbestos, including the
chrysotile in brake linings, can create a risk of getting mesothelioma. In direct contrast to
the view of Ford, she stated, based on those epidemiological studies, that “there is no
question . . . that all forms of asbestos cause lung cancer and mesothelioma.” When
asked more specifically about epidemiological studies limited to persons working on brake
linings getting mesothelioma, she said that, because mesothelioma is such a relatively rare
disease (less than 2,800 cases of mesothelioma in the U.S. each year compared with nearly
200,000 annual cases of lung cancer) and because not all mechanics work on brakes, it
– 8 –
was difficult to do a specific job-related epidemiological study, and that, in such instances,
it is appropriate to look at case-control studies. Such studies, she said, have shown a
connection between working on brakes and mesothelioma.
The part of Dr. Welch’s opinion most directly challenged by Ford, and found
useless by the Court of Special Appeals, came in response to a hypothetical question. She
was asked to assume that (1) Mr. Dixon performed approximately two brake inspections or
replacements a week, mostly on Ford vehicles, from the early 1960s through 1975, (2)
during that period, Ford brake systems contained asbestos, (3) Mr. Dixon’s work involved
removing brake drums, cleaning the drums and, when needed, replacing the brake shoes,
(4) he used compressed air to clean the brake drums and occasionally sanded or filed new
brake shoes, which created visible dust in the air, (5) dust got on his clothing and body, (6)
he did not shower before going home and wore his clothes home, (7) Ms. Dixon was a
bystander to and occasionally assisted Mr. Dixon when he worked on family cars at home,
(8) Ms. Dixon did the family laundry, which included shaking out Mr. Dixon’s dirty work
clothes, and (9) Ms. Dixon lived in the home the entire period and developed malignant
Based on those assumptions, Dr. Welch stated that Ms. Dixon would have been
exposed to asbestos from Mr. Dixon’s work on cars and that such exposure was a cause of
her mesothelioma. She was then asked to assume that Ms. Dixon also worked with or
around drywall joint compound that contained asbestos and that she was also exposed to
– 9 –
asbestos from that compound. On those further assumptions, Dr. Welch still was of the
belief that Mr. Dixon’s work with Ford brake systems was a cause of the mesothelioma
because “every exposure to asbestos is a substantial contributing cause and so brake
exposure would be a substantial cause even if she had other exposures.” She added,
somewhat more particularly, that “take-home exposures that a person has during their
lifetime [are] a substantial contributing factor to the development of an asbestos-related
disease if one occurs.” That was because “[e]very increasing dose increases the likelihood
of getting it [and] that additional doses decrease the time it takes to get the disease as
exposure goes up.”
Focusing on Dr. Welch’s statement that “every exposure to asbestos is a substantial
contributing cause,” Ford insists that the trial court erred in not subjecting her conclusion
to a Frye/Reed examination which, in its view, would have shown non-acceptance of that
conclusion by the relevant scientific community. As a fallback, it urges acceptance of the
Court of Special Appeals view that Dr. Welch’s opinion simply was not helpful to the jury
because it “conflated” scientific causation and legal causation and should have been
excluded for that reason.
The major fallacy in Ford’s contention that a Frye/Reed analysis is required is that
it looks only to the “every exposure to asbestos is a substantial contributing cause”
statement and largely ignores the other parts of her testimony that provide a context to that
one statement. In Montgomery Mutual v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314, 326, 923 A.2d 939,
– 10 –
(2007), we confirmed that the general test for determining whether to allow expert
testimony is set forth in Md. Rule 5-702 – that expert testimony, in the form of an opinion
or otherwise, may be admitted if the court determines that the evidence will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue and that, in making that
determination, the court shall determine whether the witness is qualified as an expert, the
appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and whether a sufficient
factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.
A Frye/Reed analysis is required, as a prerequisite to the application of Rule 5-702,
only when the proposed expert testimony involve
s a “novel scientific method,” in which
event there must be some assurance that the novel method has gained general acceptance
within the relevant scientific community and is not just the view of a dissident minority.
We may take judicial notice from our own decisions that the scientific community accepts
the proposition that exposure to asbestos may cause mesothelioma. That is not a novel
scientific principle. More than 20 years ago, in Eagle-Picher v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 194,
n.7, 604 A.2d 445, 452, n.7 (1992), based on evidence in the case, we flatly rejected the
assertion that mesothelioma cannot be caused by exposure to chrysotile asbestos.7 Thus,
7 In considering Eagle-Picher’s argument that there was insufficient knowledge
prior to 1944 of the health hazards of exposure to asbestos to require warnings, we
observed in the cited footnote:
“Eagle would have us further limit the analysis to chrysotile asbestos.
Eagle argues that its products contain only chrysotile asbestos and that
mesothelioma cannot be caused by that type of asbestos. This argument
ignores conflicting evidence as to both of its underpinnings. The argument
– 11 –
Dr. Welch’s opinion that exposure to chrysotile asbestos in Ford brakes may cause
mesothelioma also is not a novel scientific principle.
We determined in Balbos that the governing standard for liability in an asbestos
case was that stated in § 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts – that an actor’s
negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm if (1) its conduct is a “substantial factor” in
bringing about the harm, and (2) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability.
We concluded as well that, in determining whether the conduct qualifies as a substantial
factor, the court must consider, among other things, the nature of the product, the
frequency of its use, the proximity, in distance and time, of a plaintiff to the use of the
product, and the regularity of the exposure of that plaintiff to the use of the product.
Balbos, 326 Md. at 210, 604 A.2d at 460.
In Scapa v. Saville, 418 Md. 496, 503, 16 A.3d 159, 163 (2011) we confirmed that
the Balbos “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test remains “the common law
evidentiary standard used for establishing substantial-factor causation in negligence cases
alleging asbestos exposure.” The question is whether the evidence, viewed at the
appellate level in a light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial, suffices to meet that
test. In Scapa, we held that evidence that the plaintiff, Mr. Saville, regularly handled
Scapa’s asbestos-containing product on a daily basis for at least one year was legally
also ignores that the jury could have found that the expert on whose
testimony the argument rests had been substantially impeached.”
– 12 –
sufficient to create a jury question on proximate cause. Id. at 505, 16 A.3d at 164.
As noted, the evidence in this case was that Mr. Dixon worked on Ford brakes, on
average, twice a week, 10 months a year, for 13 years, and that Ms. Dixon dealt with the
dust-laden clothes and the ubiquitous asbestos fibers on most of those occasions. Even
acknowledging that Mr. Dixon’s work was part-time evening work, that translates into his
bringing home asbestos-laden dust from Ford brakes on more than 1,000 days, which, in
terms of Ms. Dixon’s exposure to that dust, is at least on a par with Mr. Saville’s exposure
in terms of frequency, regularity, and proximity.
Dr. Welch’s ultimate opinion was based on that evidence and more – not just the
raw number of occasions that the dust was brought into the home twice a week over a 13-
year period, but as well on evidence that, because the asbestos fibers brought in on each
occasion remained in the home for a considerable period of time, the exposure was
continuous and cumulative in effect. With that background and context, we are unwilling
to conclude that Dr. Welch’s opinion that each exposure increased the likelihood of
contracting mesothelioma and thus constituted a substantial contributing factor involved a
novel scientific theory not generally accepted in the scientific community. Her opinion
was not in the context of one or two incidental exposures to Ford brakes.
In contending that Dr. Welch’s one statement is not generally accepted in the
scientific community, Ford cites a number of out-of-State cases, some of which, on
examination, are distinguishable in a number of respects. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 2013
– 13 –
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7861 (D. Utah 2013), for example, is an unreported U. S. District Court
opinion in which the judge concluded that an “every exposure” opinion was inadmissible
under Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125
L. Ed.2d 469 (1993) when the evidence showed that the plaintiff was exposed to Ford
brakes only seven times 45 years before the suit was filed. A somewhat similar
circumstance existed in Butler v. Union Carbide Corporation, 712 S.E.2d 537 (Ga. App.
2011), an intermediate appellate court ruling affirming the disallowance, under Daubert,
of an “every exposure” opinion, when the evidence showed that less than one percent of
the product to which the plaintiff may have been exposed was that of the defendant Union
The closest case cited, at least facially, is Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27
(Pa. 2012), in which the court sustained the decision of the trial judge (1) to conduct a
Frye examination with respect to an “every exposure” opinion, and (2) to disallow the
opinion as inconsistent with a “substantial factor” analysis. That case, too, though the
court’s opinion is a thorough one, is distinguishable. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
took the case as a test case, from among others then pending, to examine the “every
exposure” theory in a global context, without regard, it seems, to any particular facts. The
court made that clear in rejecting the plaintiff’s urging that the case was “not a case of de
minimis exposure,” noting that “this case was selected among test cases for the anyexposure
opinion as a means, in and of itself, to establish substantial-factor causation.” Id.
– 14 –
at 55 . That is not the context of this case.
All we know from the court’s opinion regarding the facts of the Betz case is that
the plaintiff worked as an automobile mechanic for 44 years, during which he was exposed
to asbestos-containing friction products, such as brake linings, that he eventually
contracted mesothelioma, from which he died, and that the lawsuit was against several
defendants. There is nothing in the court’s opinion as to how many brake linings he
worked with or whose. What was before the court was the proposed expert’s “broad-scale
opinion on causation applicable to anyone inhaling a single asbestos fiber above
background exposure levels.” Id. at 54 . That kind of opinion, if offered in a case of truly
minimal exposure to the defendant’s product, may well raise concerns that would need to
be tested under Frye/Reed, but, as we have indicated, that is not what is
before us here.
Dr. Welch’s opinion was based on evidence of repeated exposures by Ms. Dixon to highlevel
doses of asbestos fibers emanating from Ford brakes and must be viewed in that
Ford fares no better in its reliance on the Court of Special Appeals’ “probabilistic
causation” analysis, from which that court concluded that, in order for a trier of fact to find
that exposure to a particular asbestos product constitutes a substantial contributing factor,
there must not only be evidence of the quantity of the alleged exposure but also
“quantitative epidemiological evidence,” and that, lacking that evidence, Dr. Welch’s
opinion that Ms. Dixon’s exposure to asbestos from Ford brakes constituted a substantial
– 15 –
contributing factor could not have been of any help to the jury and was therefore wrongly
admitted. We note initially that, despite the court’s attempt in footnote 13 of its opinion to
draw a distinction, that view seems directly inconsistent with the court’s pronouncement in
ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 671, 710 A.2d 944, 984 (1998) rejecting that very
proposition and stating “[w]e shall not hold that a plaintiff in any asbestos case must
present expert testimony as to the amount of respirable asbestos fibers emitted by a
Even to the extent that philosophers of science might find some underlying merit in
the court’s articulation of its “probabilistic causation” analysis, its application of that
analysis in reaching its ultimate conclusion improperly viewed the one statement by Dr.
Welch that each exposure increased the likelihood of Ms. Dixon contracting the disease
and thus was a substantial contributing factor in isolation, detached from the hypotheses
on which it was based. As we have pointed out, those hypotheses, which formed a part of
Dr. Welch’s opinion and were supported by substantial evidence, took account not only of
the frequency of Ms. Dixon’s exposure to asbestos-laden dust from Ford brakes but why
that repeated exposure was of high, not low, intensity.
Viewed properly in context, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
the testimony. In light of that conclusion, the issues of whether any error by the trial court
was harmless and whether judgment should have been entered in favor of Ford are moot.
– 16 –
CROSS-CLAIMS AGAINST GEORGIA-PACIFIC AND HONEYWELL
RESTATED QUESTION (3)
As noted, the plaintiffs joined Georgia-Pacific and several other manufacturers as
co-defendants and, until shortly before trial, maintained that Ms. Dixon’s exposure to their
asbestos-laden products also was a substantial contributing causes of her mesothelioma.
Prior to the scheduled trial, however, the plaintiffs settled with those co-defendants and
thereafter pursued their case only against Ford. By stipulation, they dismissed all of their
claims against Georgia-Pacific. Because Ford had filed cross-claims against those codefendants,
however, they remained as defendants in the case, and Ford sought to show
that their products were substantial contributing causes of Ms. Dixon’s disease.
At the conclusion of the evidence, Ford did not move for judgment against Georgia-
Pacific or Honeywell on its cross-claims, perhaps on the theory that such a motion was
premature until Ford’s liability to the plaintiffs was established. The issue was submitted
to the jury which, as noted, answered “No” to whether Ms. Dixon’s exposure to Georgia-
Pacific’s or Honeywell’s product was a substantial contributing factor in causing her
mesothelioma. Following rendition of the verdicts, Ford moved for judgment NOV under
Rule 2-532 on its cross-claims against those two co-defendants, arguing that the jury’s
verdict with respect to them was inconsistent with its finding of liability on the part of
Ford and therefore was against the weight of the evidence. Rule 2-532(a) expressly states,
however, that “[i]n a jury trial, a party may move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
only if that party made a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence and only on
– 17 –
the grounds advanced in support of the earlier motion.”
Though recognizing some merit in Ford’s contention that, until Ford’s liability was
established, a motion for judgment on those cross-claims would have been premature, the
trial court, relying largely on Scapa v. Saville, 190 Md. App. 331, 348-51, 988 A.2d 1059,
1068-70 (2010) concluded that a motion for judgment was indeed a prerequisite to a
motion for judgment NOV and denied the JNOV motion for that reason. Nonetheless,
exercising its broad discretion under Rule 2-535 to revise an unenrolled judgment, the
court struck the judgment in favor of Georgia-Pacific and entered judgment for Ford. It
did so for two reasons – because of “the comments during closing arguments,” upon which
the court did not elaborate, and because “there was so much evidence, dramatic evidence
against Georgia-Pacific.” The court expressed disbelief that a reasonable jury could have
found that there was no liability on the part of Georgia-Pacific. It did not have the same
view with respect to Honeywell and declined to provide relief with respect to that
Neither side is entirely happy with that result. The plaintiffs complain that the trial
court erred in using Rule 2-535 as an “end run” around the clear requirement of Rule 2-
532(a), and Ford complains that the court erred in not providing the same relief with
respect to Honeywell. As noted, the Court of Special Appeals did not address those
Although the cross-claim issue became moot under the Court of Special Appeals
– 18 –
ruling that there was no liability on Ford’s part, in light of our conclusion that the
intermediate appellate court was wrong in that respect, it is moot no longer, and, indeed,
raises the questions whether (1) a motion for judgment on a cross-claim that is contingent
on a finding of liability on the part of the movant is permissible in advance of a finding
that the movant is liable, (2) if not, there is an implied exception to the requirement in Rule
2-532(a) that such a motion be filed, and (3) if there is no such implied exception and Rule
2-532(a) would require denial of a motion for JNOV, it is permissible or appropriate for a
court to invoke Rule 2-535(a) to circumvent that requirement. Fortunately, in this case, it
is not necessary to address those issues, for there is another reason, apparent in the record,
to conclude that the trial court erred in effectively reversing the jury’s verdict.
As we have observed, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ dismissal of their claims
against Georgia-Pacific, that company remained a defendant with respect to Ford’s crossclaim,
and every effort was made by Ford to establish that the Georgia-Pacific product was
at least a, if not the, substantial contributing cause of Ms. Dixon’s mesothelioma. The
critical evidence, however, which focused on (1) the Dixons’ installation of drywall during
the construction of their house in 1963-64, (2) construction of an additi
on to the house in
1971-73, (3) the installation of drywall and textured ceilings during the construction of the
apartment building later in 1976-78, and (4) drywall work that Mr. Dixon did for some
friends, was not altogether clear. In the three projects on their property, Ms. Dixon did
much of the sanding and was exposed to the dust emanating therefrom.
– 19 –
The Dixons said that, when building the house in the early 1960s, they did not use
a pliable compound, such as Ready-Mix, but instead used a powder that they mixed with
water. There was no evidence that the powder was manufactured or marketed by Georgia-
Pacific or that it contained asbestos; Mr. and Ms. Dixon both testified that they did not
know who manufactured the product. They acknowledged using a Georgia-Pacific
compound when constructing the addition to the home in the early 1970s, but did not
specifically identify the compound as Ready-Mix. They said only that it came in buckets
that had the Georgia-Pacific name or the letters GP on them. That was the case as well
when building the apartments later in 1976-78.
Until 1977, Georgia-Pacific marketed a Ready-Mix compound that contained
asbestos, and it is possible that the Dixons used that product when they constructed the
addition to their home and when they built the apartment building. Mr. and Ms. Dixon
both acknowledged that they used a Georgia-Pacific product, although neither identified it
as Ready-Mix. Beginning in 1974, however, Georgia-Pacific marketed a Ready-Mix
compound that did not contain asbestos, and it is also possible that the Dixons used that
product instead, at least when constructing the apartments. In short, there was no direct
evidence that the compound they used in any of the projects was asbestos-laden Ready-
Mix, although an inference to that effect was certainly permissible.
During closing argument to the jury, the plaintiffs’ attorney spoke briefly about the
culpability of Georgia-Pacific. He said that, until about a month before trial, he thought he
– 20 –
could prove Ms. Dixon’s exposure to Georgia-Pacific’s joint compound, but that, after
taking the deposition of a Georgia-Pacific witness, he concluded that he would be unable
to establish that exposure. Ford objected to those statements and moved for a mistrial.
The court denied the motion and instead gave a curative instruction that the attorney’s
statements were improper and should be disregarded. Clearly, at that point, the court was
convinced that a mistrial was not called for and that the curative instruction sufficed.
In his closing argument, Ford’s attorney mentioned Georgia-Pacific only in passing,
noting that there was evidence that the drywall compound used by the Dixons was made
by Georgia-Pacific and that asbestos was in the compound “during certain years.”
A trial circuit court’s discretion under Rule 2-535(a) to revise an unenrolled
judgment is broad. Although in several cases, our predecessors have referred to it as
“unrestricted,” in Southern Management v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 495, 836 A.2d 627, 646
(2003), we observed that, because the exercise of the trial court’s discretion is subject to
appellate review, it is not truly unrestricted but simply broad. That is a more accurate
description. The purpose of allowing that discretion, which informs any limits to it, is “to
ensure that technicality does not triumph over justice.” Id. 378 Md. 494, 836 A.2d 646.
The purpose is not to allow the trial judge to upset jury verdicts that he or she simply does
not agree with, for, if that were the standard, there would be little left to the right of jury
trial in civil cases guaranteed under Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of
– 21 –
On this record, we believe that the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside
the jury’s verdict on the cross-claim against Georgia-Pacific. There was no direct
evidence that Ms. Dixon was ever exposed to asbestos emanating from a Georgia-Pacific
product. At best, an inference could fairly have been drawn that she was, which made the
issue one for the jury to resolve. The court carefully and properly instructed the jury on
the standards it was to apply in weighing the evidence, explaining that the jury was the
sole judge of whether testimony should be believed and of the weight of the evidence and
that the party asserting a cross-claim had the burden of proving it. The court told the jury
that, in determining whether the party with the burden of proof met that burden, it should
consider the quality of all of the evidence and that, if the evidence was evenly divided on
an issue, the finding should be against the party having the burden of proof.
There is no indication that, with respect to Ford’s cross-claim, the jury did anything
other than what it was instructed to do and what was properly within its province to do.
There was no triumph of technicality over justice. The verdict was not against the weight
of the evidence but simply reflected the jury’s belief that evidence of Ms. Dixon’s
exposure to asbestos from a Georgia-Pacific product was insufficient to show by a
preponderance that such exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing her
mesothelioma. That conclusion renders the question of whether the court should have
stricken the judgment for Honeywell moot.
– 22 –
CAP ON AWARD OF NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES – RESTATED QUESTION (4)
Maryland Code, § 11-108(b)(2) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article limits the damages
for non-economic loss in a personal injury or wrongful death action to a fixed upset
amount – $500,000 for causes of action arising on or after October 1, 1994, that amount to
increase by $15,000 on October 1 of each year after 1994. Section 11-108(b)(3)(ii)
provides that, in a wrongful death action in which there are two or more claimants, an
award for non-economic damages may not exceed 150% of the limitation established
under § 11-108(b)(2), regardless of the number of claimants or beneficiaries who share in
the award. As noted, applying that statute, the court reduced the wrongful death award to
Mr. Dixon from $5,000,000 to $426,000 and the awards to each of the four daughters from
$1,500,000 to $159,750.
There is no dispute that, under the statute in effect when this cause of action arose,
the reductions are numerically correct. The plaintiffs’ claim is that § 11-108(b)(3)(ii)
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 Amendment and Articles th 5, 19, 23, and 24
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and that there should have been no reductions in the
To provide some context to the plaintiffs’ argument, it is helpful to review the
evolution of § 11-108. It was first enacted in 1986 (1986 Md. Laws, ch. 639). As
introduced, the bill was limited to personal injury claims arising from medical malpractice
but, during the session, it was amended to apply to all personal injury actions. In Murphy
– 23 –
v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368, 601 A.2d 102, 114 (1992), we observed that the bill was
the product of a legislatively perceived crisis concerning the availability and cost of
liability insurance, especi
ally for persons engaged in hazardous activities or who were
health care providers. The legislative perception was derived from the reports of two
gubernatorial task forces — one concerned with liability insurance generally and the other
with medical malpractice insurance in particular. Both reports recommended a cap on
non-economic damages of $250,000. The General Assembly opted for a cap of $350,000.
The 1986 law was a simple one. It defined “non-economic damages,” it provided
that, in any action for personal injury arising on or after July 1, 1986, an award for noneconomic
damages may not exceed $350,000, and it required the trier of fact to itemize an
award for personal injury to reflect the amounts intended for past medical expenses, future
medical expenses, past loss of earnings, future loss of earnings, non-economic damages,
and other damages. It said nothing about the procedure for applying the cap on noneconomic
damages – whether the jury was to incorporate the cap into its verdict as part of
its itemization or the court was to apply the cap post-verdict, and it said nothing regarding
whether the cap applied to wrongful death actions.
The first reported challenge to the cap came in what began as a product liability
personal injury action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. It was not a
death case. When, prior to trial, the statutory cap on non-economic damages was raised,
the plaintiffs added a count for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that the cap
– 24 –
violated the right of jury trial guaranteed by the 7 Amendment to the th U.S. Constitution
and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
In an opinion by Judge Niemeyer, the court concluded that the statute did not
infringe on the right of jury trial. He reasoned that (1) “a legislature adopting a
prospective rule of law that limits all claims for pain and suffering in all cases is not acting
as a fact finder in a legal controversy,” and (2) the power of the legislature to define or
even abolish complete causes of action necessarily included the power to define what
damages may be recovered by a litigant, especially with respect to non-economic damages,
which are often speculative and are not guided by any economic standard of measurement.
Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corporation, 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1331-32 (D. Md. 1989).
In considering some of the wording of the statute, Judge Niemeyer noted the
requirement that the trier of fact itemize its award, so that non-economic damages can be
identified for purposes of the cap, and concluded that the jury could not properly discharge
that function without being instructed in advance about the limitation and that there was
“no logical reason to keep the jury in ignorance of the cap.” Id at 1329.
Shortly on the heels of Franklin, the Court of Special Appeals decided Potomac
Electric v. Smith, 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768 (1989), a survivor’s and wrongful death
action arising from the death of a child who came into contact with a downed power line.
A substantial jury award of non-economic damages was reduced in accordance with the
1986 version of the statute. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that (1) the cap did not apply
– 25 –
to wrongful death actions because such an action was not one for personal injury, and (2)
if it did apply, it violated the right of jury trial, Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights, due
process, and equal protection.
The intermediate appellate court concluded that the legislative intent was for the
cap to apply to wrongful death actions but, because the plaintiffs had agreed to a lump sum
award, it was not necessary to decide whether the cap applied to the amount allocated to
each claimant individually. Citing Judge Niemeyer’s opinion in Franklin, the court held
that the cap did not infringe on the right of jury trial and did not violate Art. 19, due
process, or, applying the rational basis test, equal protection.
The Franklin decision was filed in February 1989, during the pendency of the 1989
session of the General Assembly. Obviously concerned about the court’s requirement that
the jury be informed of the cap, the Legislature amended § 11-108 to provide that the jury
not be informed of the limitation and that, if the jury awards an amount for non-economic
damages that exceeds the limitation, the court shall reduce the amount to conform with the
limitation. That amendment took effect July 1, 1989 and was made applicable to jury trials
commenced after that date. See 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 629.
The next significant event in this historical chain was Bartucco v. Wright, 746 F.
Supp. 604 (D.Md. 1990), a wrongful death action filed by the parents of a child killed in
an automobile accident. The jury awarded damages of $300,000 to each parent, and the
defendants moved to reduce the awards, arguing that the cap was on the aggregate award,
– 26 –
not on the award to each parent. Synchronizing § 11-108 with the wrongful death statute,
the District Court, in an opinion by Judge Garbis, rejected that approach. Relying on the
Court of Special Appeals decision in Potomac Electric, the court concluded that the cap
applied to wrongful death actions but that, in such actions, it applied to each claimant
individually and not the aggregate award. Aware of the recent legislative direction that the
jury not be told of the limitation, the court held that “[a]bsent a separate damage cap for
each plaintiff, it would be difficult to square the need for the jury to consider each plaintiff
separately in determining his or her appropriate recovery with the prohibition against
informing the jury of the cap.” Id. at 608.
This Court’s first pronouncements regarding the cap came two years later in
Murphy v. Edmonds, supra, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102, which was an ordinary personal
injury action not involving death. Applying a heightened scrutiny test, the trial judge
found that the cap violated equal protection and declined to reduce a $510,000 award for
non-economic damages. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s
reasoning, held that the cap was Constitutional, and directed that the award for noneconomic
damages be reduced to $350,000. This Court affirmed the judgment of the
intermediate appellate court.
We agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that the rational basis test was the
appropriate one to apply and that § 11-108 satisfied that test. We next concluded that §
11-108 “fully preserves the right of having a jury resolve the factual issues with regard to
– 27 –
the amount of noneconomic damages,” noting that “[n]either the $350,000 limit on
recovery nor the provision that the jury not be informed of the limit, interferes with the
jury’s proper role and its ability to resolve the factual issues which are pertinent to the
cause of action.” Id. at 373, 601 A.2d at 117. Finally, although not raised in the briefs,
the Court also concluded that the cap did not amount to a restriction on access to the courts
and therefore did not contravene Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights. See also Oaks v.
Connors, 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423 (1995), confirming Murphy and holding that the
individual cap applicable in a non-death personal injury action included damages awarded
on a loss of consortium claim; there was not a separate cap for that claim.
A year later, in United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993), we
rejected the views of the U.S. District Court in Franklin and the Court of Special Appeals
in Potomac Electric and held that the General Assembly did not intend for the cap to apply
to awards in wrongful death actions. That ruling had a very short shelf life. In its next
session, the General Assembly amended § 11-108 to make clear that, from and after
October 1, 1994, the cap applied to non-economic damages awarded in wrongful death
actions. See 1994 Md. Laws, ch. 477.
It was in that 1994 law that the Legislature generated the issue now before us, by
drawing a distinction between wrongful death actions and other personal injury cases with
respect to the application of the cap. It mandated that, in personal injury actions generally,
the cap on non-economic damages applied to “each direct victim of tortious conduct and
all persons who claim injury through that victim,” but “in a wrongful death action in which
there are two or more claimants or beneficiaries, an award for noneconomic damages may
not exceed 150% of the limitation . . . regardless of the number of claimants or
drew a distinction between primary and secondary claimants in wrongful death actions for
purposes of the cap and established a clear preference for primary claimants.8 If the
amount of non-economic damages for primary claimants equals or exceeds the applicable
cap, the court must (1) reduce each individual award of a primary claimant proportionately
to the total award of all primary claimants so that the total award to all claimants or
beneficiaries conforms to the 150% limitation, and (2) reduce each award to a secondary
claimant to zero. If the award to primary claimants does not exceed the 150% limitation,
individual award of a secondary claimant proportionately to the total of all secondary
claimants so that the total award to all claimants or beneficiaries conforms to the
limitation. We are not concerned with that statute in this appeal.
Although citing some Federal and State court rulings in other States striking down a
child, parent of a minor child, or certain unmarried adult children. A secondary claimant
is one suing for the death of a child or parent not within the definition of primary
claimant. See § 11-108(a)(3) and (4) and Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. §§ 3-904(d) and (e).
cap on non-economic damages as being in violation of those States’ Constitutions, the
plaintiffs, presumably with some reluctance, accept this Court’s determination in Murphy
and Oaks that the cap on individual non-economic damage awards provided for in § 11-
108(b)(2) does not infringe on the right to jury trial or, using the rational basis test, on the
right to equal protection of the law. That kind of cap, they note, was based on studies
showing that $250,000 would cover most claims for non-economic damages, and still
allows the jury to focus on the loss suffered by each individual claimant.
What they complain about, and observe that this Court has never addressed, is the
effect of creating a lump sum cap without regard to how many claimants there are and not
informing the jury of that cap. They note that there were no studies attesting to the
reasonableness of that kind of cap, which effectively requires the court to redistribute the
jury’s awards and thus ignores the jury’s perception of the actual degree of loss suffered
by each of the individual claimants, which may differ from one to another. They aver that
the legal impact of that is to improperly invade the jury’s fact-finding province and to
constitute an arbitrary and discriminatory classification. Each individual with identical
numerical calculations used in applying the cap. The jury awarded non-economic
damages to the wrongful death claimants in the total amount of $10 million – $4 million
(40%) for Mr. Dixon and $1.5 million (15%) for each of the four daughters. The
applicable cap under § 11-108(b)(2) to an individual claimant was $710,000. Applying
the 150% enhancement under § 11-108(b)(3)(ii) brought to aggregate cap to $1,065,000.
The court divided that cap proportionately to the jury awards – 40% (426,000) to Mr.
Three years ago, in DRD v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 5 A.3d 45 (2010), we had a similar
case, though not a similar argument, before us. DRD involved both a survivor’s action
and a wrongful death claim by the parents of a child who drowned in a pool managed by
DRD. The trial court granted summary judgment to DRD in the survivor’s action on the
ground that there was no direct evidence that the child suffered any pain or suffering in the
drowning process but allowed the wrongful death claim to go to the jury. The jury
Applying § 11-108(b)(3)(ii), the trial court reduced the aggregate award to $1,002,500.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the summary judgment entered in the survivor’s
action and affirmed the reduction of the wrongful death award. Freed v. D.R.D., 186 Md.
App. 477, 974 A.2d 978 (2009).
Special Appeals. In their brief in this Court, the Freeds acknowledged the precedential
effect of Murphy and Oaks and did not try to distinguish them. Their argument was that
those cases were wrongly decided and should be overturned. There was no discussion in
their brief of the issue presented here – the particular impact of the 150% cap when there
are multiple wrongful death claimants – and, because that issue was not argued, it was not
discussed in our Opinion. See Brief of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners in No. 104, Sept.
Term, 2009 (2009 WL 5196414).
Dixon and 15% ($159,750) to each daughter.
We agreed that Murphy and Oaks controlled, and, despite contrary rulings in other
States, we saw no reason to overturn them. That sufficed to sustain the application of the
150% cap in that case, and, indeed, was the sole basis for sustaining that cap. What we are
asked to do here, in effect, is to reconsider that ultimate ruling on a ground not raised or
considered in that case – a new and different basis for examining the Constitutionality of
the 1994 amendments to § 11-108. We shall address the argument made by the plaintiffs
and not regard it as foreclosed by Freed, but our belief that 10 the 150% cap is not
unconstitutional will not change.
injury action based on injuries to more than one person, each plaintiff, whether suing
separately or joining with other plaintiffs, represents a separate case. Any judgments are
awarded separately, on an individual basis. The plaintiffs do not share in one gross award.
That is not the case with a wrongful death action. Only one wrongful death action
is permissible with respect to the death of a person. All beneficiaries seeking a recovery
are required to join in that action, and one award is made, which is divided among the
plaintiffs as directed by the verdict. See Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. § 3-904 (1989 Repl. Vol.
10 In Crane v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 800 A.2d 727 (2002), we also had before us
a wrongful death action by multiple claimants in which the 150% cap was applied to
reduce the jury’s verdict. The issue there was whether the cap was applicable, not
whether it was valid, and we therefore did not consider the Constitutional validity of the
reduction. Id. at 375, n. 2, 800 A.2d at 730, n.2.
and 2006 Repl. Vol.). Unless that approach was to be changed, which the Legislature
declined to do, any cap had to take account of it.
Three bills were introduced into the 1994 session dealing with the cap on noneconomic
damages – SB 283, HB 661, and HB 511. All three provided both for an
increase in the cap and its extension to wrongful death actions. Although we are
principally concerned with SB 283, which was the one that was enacted, the proceedings
on the two House Bills influenced the ultimate text of SB 283. The Department of
Legislative Services bill files on all three bills are voluminous. There were many letters
and many formal reports on all sides of the issues – whether to impose any cap on
wrongful death awards and, if so, what the amount of the cap should be and whether it
should be retroactive.
As introduced, SB 283 increased the cap from $350,000 to $450,000, subject to the
annual increase of $15,000, and provided that, in a wrongful death action, that cap would
apply regardless of the number of claimants or beneficiaries who would share in the
award. House Bill 661 increased the cap over a three-year period, in increments of
$50,000, to $500,000. That aspect was prospective. It also provided, retroactively to
causes of action arising on or after June 1,1986 that were not yet adjudicated, that the
applicable cap applied as well in wrongful death actions, regardless of the number of
claimants. House Bill 511 took a different approach. As introduced, it would have
increased the cap incrementally to $750,000 and applied the cap on a per claimant basis in
both ordinary personal injury actions and wrongful death actions.
Following the hearing on the House Bills, in February 1994, several members of the
House Judiciary Committee requested the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society,
which provided medical malpractice insurance to most of the physicians in the State, to
provide estimates of the impact of individual caps on insurance premiums. The company
responded that, if there was a single cap (as provided for in HB 661), there would be a
need for an immediate overall rate increase of 15%. If there were to be two caps, there
would be an immediate need for a 30% increase in premiums, and, if there were to be three
caps, the immediate increase would need to be 40%. In a separate letter, the company
provided statistical support for those predictions. See letters from David Murray,
President and Chief Operating Officer of Medical Mutual, to the Chair of the House
Legislative Services Bill File for HB 511 (1994). Presumably as a result of that response,
HB 511 was amended in Committee to provide a single cap of 200% in multi-claimant
wrongful death actions, but neither of the House Bills was enacted.
weeks after the hearing on the House bills. The Committee was well aware of the two
House bills and the correspondence from Medical Mutual regarding the impact of separate
caps in wrongful death actions. Not only did some of the same people who testified on the
House Bills testify on the Senate Bill, but the letters from Medical Mutual to the Judiciary
Committee were provided to the Senate Committee as well. See Department of Legislative
Services Bill File for SB 283. The Judicial Proceedings Committee kept the individual cap
at $450,000 but added amendments (1) to increase the cap in wrongful death actions where
there was more than one claimant to 150% of the individual cap, and (2) if the jury verdict
exceeded that cap, to require the court to reduce the award proportionately. See Senate
Journal (1994) at 1910-11.
The bill passed the Senate in that form. The House of Delegates amended the bill
to conform with the amended version of HB 511 – to increase the individual cap to
$500,000 and the wrongful death cap where there was more than one claimant to 200% of
the individual cap. See House Journal (1994) at 2603-05. The Senate refused to concur in
the House amendments (Senate Journal at 3015-20), and the House refused to recede from
them (House Journal at 3015), so the bill was referred to a Conference Committee, which
agreed to an individual cap of $500,000 but otherwise rejected the House amendments and
thus kept the wrongful death cap at 150% of the individual cap. House Journal at 3354-
59. Both Houses concurred in the Conference Committee recommendations, and the bill
was enacted in that form.
This history dispels the plaintiffs’ contention that there was nothing before the
Legislature dealing with the effect of a cap on a lump sum wrongful death award, when
coupled with the jury’s not being advised of the cap. It is evident that the Legislature was
well aware of the various options that had been presented and the pros and cons of each,
and it reached a compromise. The legislative approach is a rational one that is entirely
consistent with the long-standing statutory requirement that all individuals seeking
damages for the death of a person must join in one action against the defendant and that
the amount recovered is divided among the beneficiaries in shares directed by the verdict.
The 150% cap does not intrude on the jury’s right to determine the relative degree
of harm suffered by the individual claimants; nor does it create irrational classifications
among the claimants. Section 11-108(b)(3)(ii) merely sets a limit on the gross amount of
non-economic damages that may be awarded by reason of one’s death which, under the
wrongful death law, is then divided proportionately as determined by the jury. That is
precisely what was done here. Each daughter, who was awarded 15% of the gross award
by the jury, received 15% of the net amount under the cap; the surviving husband received
40% – the percentage the jury determined he should receive. The fashioning of such a
cap in wrongful death actions is no more odious or unlawful than the imposition of caps in
non-death personal injury actions. We find no violation of equal protection, due process,
Ford complains that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ford’s motion
for new trial because (1) the jury’s verdict holding Ford liable to the plaintiffs was against
the weight of the evidence, and (2) that verdict was influenced by improper comments by
plaintiffs’ attorney during closing argument. This argument need not detain us long. We
have discussed in some detail the evidence presented at trial, and we have considered the
comments in question and the court’s conclusion that a curative instruction was sufficient.
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling.
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS DIXON, ET AL.
BE PAID BY RESPONDENT FORD MOTOR COMPANY.
BERNARD DIXON, etc. et al.
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
which Bell, C.J., joins.
Court prior to the filing of the opinion.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the excellent analysis and decision of the Court
of Special Appeals, Dixon v. Ford Motor Company, 206 Md. App. 180, 47 A.3d 1038